Lis pendens in fraudulent conveyance claims: Kirkeby v Superior Court, 2004 by Bernhardt, Roger
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
2004
Lis pendens in fraudulent conveyance claims:
Kirkeby v Superior Court, 2004
Roger Bernhardt
Golden Gate University School of Law, rbernhardt@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernhardt, Roger, "Lis pendens in fraudulent conveyance claims: Kirkeby v Superior Court, 2004" (2004). Publications. Paper 317.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/317
Lis pendens in fraudulent conveyance claims: 
Kirkeby v Superior Court, 2004 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Fraudulent conveyance claim seeking to void transfer of real property affects title to or 
right to possession of that real property and therefore supports recording of lis pendens. 
Kirkeby v Superior Court (2004) 33 C4th 642, 15 CR3d 805 
Kirkeby, who controlled 49 percent of the stock of FasTags, Inc., sued the officers, directors, 
and attorneys of the company. The complaint in her derivative action contained 27 causes of 
action, including one to annul fraudulent conveyances of two properties to a family trust of the 
majority shareholders. She recorded notices of lis pendens against the two properties. The trial 
court found that Kirkeby’s complaint, primarily involving money damages, had not stated a real 
property claim, and ordered the lis pendens expunged. Under CCP §405.4, a real property claim 
is a cause of action in a pleading “which would, if meritorious, affect . . . title to, or the right to 
possession of, specific real property.” The court of appeal agreed that the complaint did not 
support a lis pendens. 
The California Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Kirkeby’s fraudulent conveyance 
claim affected “title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property.” The court pointed 
out that a fraudulent conveyance claim that seeks to avoid a transfer, could, if successful, result 
in the voiding of a transfer of title of specific real property. See CC §3439.07(a)(1). In this case, 
Kirkeby adequately pled a fraudulent conveyance claim by alleging the transfer of title of the 
subject properties with the intent to defraud, and she asked the court to void the transfers of both 
properties to the extent necessary to satisfy the claims in her complaint. The court rejected the 
defense argument that a lis pendens was not a permissible remedy under the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act (UFTA) (CC §§3439–3439.12). The court noted that, although the UFTA does not 
specifically provide for lis pendens as a remedy, it does not exclude it, and CC 
§3439.07(a)(3)(C) entitles a creditor bringing a UFTA claim to “[a]ny other relief the 
circumstances may require.” 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: It is intriguing to wonder how the supreme court can unanimously 
decide that a lis pendens is proper in a fraudulent conveyance action when both the trial 
court and the court of appeal had concluded just the opposite. Who is it who doesn’t 
understand? 
For the lower courts, the issue was clear because the plaintiff’s basic claim was for 
money she had been swindled out of in a non-real-estate commercial venture; her only 
purpose in the fraudulent conveyance action was to ensure that an asset be kept available 
from which she could satisfy her judgment. For the supreme court, however, that 
underlying-purpose analysis is trumped by a plain-meaning test: An action to set aside a 
conveyance of real property is, by definition, one that affects title or possession of real 
property; if the legislators didn’t mean what they said, let them fix it. 
While that is an easy conclusion to make, I wonder if this court will agree with the same 
logic when it must address the question it was not deciding here: whether an action to 
impose a constructive trust also supports a lis pendens. According to this plain-meaning 
logic, imposing a trust on real property clearly affects its title as much as a lis pendens; so 
that case should be another slam dunk. 
The proper scope of the lis pendens raises difficult policy issues, as I discussed in my 
column (see Bernhardt, The Lessened Lis Pendens, 26 CEB RPLR 178 (Sept. 2003)) on the 
now-depublished court of appeal decision in Kirkeby v Superior Court (2003) 109 CA4th 
1275, 135 CR2d 861, reported in 26 CEB RPLR 192 (Sept. 2003). By virtue of its literal 
plain-meaning approach, the high court has passed the ball to the legislature, which means 
that that body may itself have to confront the issue. —Roger Bernhardt  
 
